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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Mitchell Lee Walck appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition following his 2014 convictions and 
sentences for second degree kidnapping, aggravated assault on a law 
enforcement officer, and robbery. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 The district court explained the facts and proceedings of Walck’s 
underlying criminal case as follows: 
 In case no. CRF-2012-21458, petitioner pled guilty to second 
degree kidnapping, aggravated assault on a law enforcement 
officer, and robbery, in accord with a binding plea agreement 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 11.  The parties agreed that the 
sentences would run concurrently, but were otherwise open to 
argument.  Petitioner affirmed that no one threatened him or made 
any promises outside of the plea agreement to him.  He indicated 
that he understood the agreement, the charges, his rights, and the 
potential penalties.  He indicated that he was not under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.  The court accepted petitioner’s plea 
as a free and voluntary act.  
 
 On the kidnapping count, the court imposed a sentence of 
20 years fixed and 25 years indeterminate,[1] for a total term not to 
exceed 25 years.  On the aggravated assault count, the court 
imposed a sentence of 10 years fixed and zero years 
indeterminate, for a total term not to exceed 10 years.  On the 
robbery count, the court imposed a sentence of 20 years fixed and 
life indeterminate, for a total term not to exceed life.  These 
sentences were ordered to run concurrent with a sentence that 
petitioner was serving in North Dakota. 
 
                                            
1  Obviously, the indeterminate portion of Walck’s sentence for kidnapping is five 
years, for a total unified sentence of 25 years.  See Idaho Board of Correction 
website: https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search. 
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 Defendant appealed and subsequently moved to dismiss his 
appeal. The remittitur dismissing defendant’s appeal was filed on 
January 20, 2015. 
 
(R., pp.34-35.) 
 On November 23, 2015, Walck filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
with a supporting affidavit.  (R., pp.4-12.)  In his petition, Walck claimed, inter 
alia:  (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for (a) coercing him into pleading guilty, 
and (b) failing to consolidate his case “with other Idaho counties that had pending 
charges”; (2) he was illegally convicted and sentenced, under principles of 
double jeopardy, for a crime for which he had already been convicted and 
sentenced in North Dakota; and (3) related to his “coercion” by trial counsel 
claim, he pled guilty to crimes for which he was not guilty.  (R., pp.4-12, 39-40.)  
 Walck filed a motion for default, alleging the state failed to file a timely 
Answer to his post-conviction petition.2  (R., pp.29-31, 37.)  The state filed an 
Answer to Walck’s post-conviction petition (R., pp.23-24), and a motion to 
dismiss his motion for default judgment (R., pp.25-26).  The state also filed 
“Respondent’s Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Default Judgment” (R., 
pp.32-33), stating, “an Answer was filed; however, in the event that it was not 
received by the Petitioner, Petitioner cannot claim any prejudice.”  Walck filed an 
objection to the state’s request that the court deny his default judgment.  (R., 
pp.49-51.)   
                                            
2   The Clerk’s Record does not include Walck’s motion for default.  However, the 
references to such motion by the district court (see R., p.37) and the state (see 
R., pp.25-26), as well as “Petitioner’s Motion to Uphold Motion for Default 
Judgment” (see R., pp.29-31), verify that Walck filed such a motion. 
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 On January 29, 2016, the district court entered a Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss, preliminarily ruling: 
Petitioner lists multiple actions of his attorney, but he has not 
shown that the attorney’s representation failed to meet objective 
standards of competence or that any prejudice resulted from his 
counsel’s performance.  He has not shown that the results would 
have been any different had counsel performed differently. 
 
 Petitioner claims he was not informed about binding Rule 11 
plea agreements, but the record shows that petitioner entered into 
one, informing the court that he understood it.  Petitioner claims he 
is “serving a sentence twice for the same crime,” but the record 
shows that he is serving his sentences concurrently for distinct 
crimes.  Petitioner claims he pled guilty to crimes for which he was 
not guilty, but the record shows that he pled guilty because he was 
guilty.  Petitioner claims that he pled guilty due to duress and 
compulsion, but the record shows that he pled guilty freely and 
voluntarily, affirming to the court that he had not been threatened. 
 
 Summary dismissal upon a motion to dismiss or at the 
court’s initiative is permissible where the evidence raises no 
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant’s 
favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief.  Gonzales 
v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 
1988); and Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 
[Ct. App. 1987].  I.C. § 19-4906(b) states: 
 
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the 
application, the answer or motion, and the record, that 
the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief 
and no purpose would be served by any further 
proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention 
to dismiss the application and its reasons for so 
doing.  The applicant shall be given an opportunity to 
reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. 
 
 Based upon the pleadings filed by petitioner, there is no 
genuine issue of material fact that would entitle him to relief if 
resolved in his favor.  An evidentiary hearing is not justified 
because petitioner has not tendered a factual showing warranting 
relief that was based upon admissible evidence.  Petitioner has not 
shown a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been 
different.  He has not presented sufficient admissible evidence or 
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proof of prejudice, but only unsubstantiated claims of wrongdoing. 
Petitioner’s filings do not provide any factual basis for relief. 
Petitioner does not submit any evidence that would lead to the 
conclusion that his guilty plea was marred by non-harmless error. 
See Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 975 P.2d 1181 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 
 Since the application fails to raise material issues of fact that 
justify an evidentiary hearing, no purpose would be served by any 
further proceedings.  Accordingly, the court intends to dismiss 
petitioner’s application.  Petitioner may reply within 20 days to this 
proposed dismissal. 
 
(R., pp.39-41.)   
 In response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, Walck filed “Petitioners [sic] 
Objection and Reply to Courts [sic] Notice of Intent and Default Judgment.”  (R., 
pp.52-64 (including attached exhibits).)  The district court entered an Order 
Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and a Judgment.  (R., pp.78-81.)  
Several days later, Walck filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment” requesting a 
telephonic hearing on three motions:  (1) his summary judgment motion, (2) his 
motion for default motion, and (3) a “post-conviction constitutional violations” 
motion (R., pp.87-89), which the court “treated collectively” as a motion for 
reconsideration, and denied (R., pp.90-92). 
 Walck filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.93-97.)  Several weeks later, 
Walck filed a “Motion to With-Draw [sic] Guilty Plea Declaring Manifest Injustices” 





Walck states the issues on appeal as: 
 
(1) Ineffective assistance of counsel (district court)[.] 
 
(2) Illegal conviction and sentence for crime already convicted of 
and serving time for concurrently [sic] with the State of North 
Dakota.  Serving a sentence (twice) for the same crime in violation 
to [sic] double jeopardy statute. 
 
(3) No consolidation of other county of Idaho charges leaving 
Appellant subjected to further arrests.[3] 
 
(4) Prosecutor failed to respond to Appellants [sic] post-conviction 
relief petition in a timely manner – no proper mailing of Answer and 
or Reply. 
 
(5) District court abused its descretion [sic] and violated the 
uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act in dismissing valid default 
judgment filing and holding an evidentiary hearing.   
 
(6) District court abused its descretion [sic] in denying a valid 
with-draw [sic] of guilty plea citing gross manifest of injustice, is 
clearly justified by Appellants [sic] proper petitions and motions 
available to Idaho Supreme Court Records-Transcripts etc. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 Has Walck failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his post-conviction claims?  Additionally, has Walck failed to show the district 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion for default judgment and erred 
in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas? 
 
                                            
3  Walck contends his trial counsel ineffectively failed to consolidate charges from 
other counties.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (“[He] . . . requested a . . . ‘globalization’ of 




Walck Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His 
Post-Conviction Claims; Additionally, He Has Failed To Show The Court Abused 
Its Discretion In Denying His Motion For Default Judgment And Erred In Denying 




 Walck challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition, 
and within that proceeding, the denial of his motion for default and the denial of 
his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.  (See generally Appellant’s Brief.)  
 Walck’s arguments fail because (1) he failed to provide the district court 
and this Court with an adequate record for appellate review of the claims related 
to the first three issues presented on appeal, (2) he failed to preserve his claim 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to change venue, 
(3) he failed to show any error in the district court’s summary dismissal order and 
order denying his motion for default, and (4) the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in a post-conviction 
proceeding.4   
 
B. Standards Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
                                            
4  Although the district court’s grounds for its decisions do not always reflect the 
precise grounds advanced in this brief, the court’s correct rulings may 
nonetheless be upheld on alternative, yet correct, bases.  See State v. Morris, 
119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, 
the lower court’s ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any 
theory); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(where district court’s ruling is correct it may be upheld on alternative basis).  
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fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
 The grant or denial of an application for the entry of default judgment in a 
post-conviction proceeding rests within the discretion of the district court.  
Johnson v. State, 112 Idaho 1112, 1114, 739 P.2d 411, 413 (1987) (per curiam).  
In determining whether the district court has abused its discretion, this Court asks 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 
1000 (1991). 
 Jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review on appeal.  State v. 
Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). 
  
C. General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983).    
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 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own 
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case 
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof.”  Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).  
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, deemed true.  Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975).   
 However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). 
 
D. Walck Has Failed To Provide The District Court And This Court With An 
Adequate Record For Appellate Review Of The Summary Dismissal Of 
His Post-Conviction Claims, As Challenged In Issues 1, 2, And 3   
 
 In his first three issues on appeal, Walck argues:  (1) his trial counsel was 
ineffective for (a) failing to file a motion for a change of venue (Appellant’s Brief, 
pp.5-6), (b) pressuring him to enter his guilty pleas (id., pp.5-7), and (c) failing to 
consolidate charges from other counties with his case (id., pp.5, 8); and (2) his 
convictions and sentences are illegal under principles of double jeopardy 
because he was convicted and sentenced for the same crime in North Dakota 
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(id., pp.5-8).5  Walck’s arguments fail, however, because he failed to provide the 
district court (and, consequently, this Court) with the Clerk’s Record and any 
transcripts of relevant proceedings from his underlying criminal case; therefore, 
he has failed to provide an adequate record for appellate review of his first three 
issues.   
 It is axiomatic that the appellant bears the burden of providing a sufficient 
record on appeal to substantiate his or her appellate claims.  State v. Beason, 
119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 
Idaho 447, 449, 680 P.2d 869, 871 (Ct. App. 1984); see also State v. Murinko, 
108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App. 1985).  “In the absence of an 
adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, [the appellate court] 
will not presume error.”  State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38, 43 P.3d 794, 797 
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Beason, 119 Idaho at 105, 803 P.2d at 1011).  To the 
contrary, any missing portions of the record are presumed to support the actions 
of the court below.  State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 
(Ct. App. 1992).   
 With regard to Walck’s claims of ineffective assistance for failing to file a 
motion for change of venue and a motion to consolidate with other charges from 
                                            
5  In regard to Issue 3, Walck’s Appellant’s Brief makes it clear he is arguing that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consolidate charges, stating: 
 
Continuing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim[,] public 
defender . . . requested a continuance to the [sic] Judge Burton to a 
‘globelization’ [sic] of my numerous charges in other counties, then 
changed his mind and told me it would be to [sic] much work 
leaving me subjected to further arrests after my plea-agreement.  
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  
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other counties, without the underlying criminal court records, Walck cannot 
establish that his trial counsel did not file such motions, much less show that, 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), counsel’s performance 
was deficient and prejudicial.  Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion that 
Walck “has not shown that the attorney’s representation failed to meet objective 
standards of competence or that any prejudice resulted from his counsel’s 
performance” is presumed to be supported by the underlying criminal record.  
See Repici, 122 Idaho at 541, 835 P.2d at 1352.   
 Similarly, without a transcript of the plea entry hearing or any other 
relevant court records and/or transcripts from his criminal case, Walck cannot 
show that his trial counsel coerced him into pleading guilty.  To the contrary, the 
district court referred to the underlying criminal case record when it ruled: 
Petitioner claims that he pled guilty to crimes for which he was not 
guilty, but the record shows that he pled guilty because he was 
guilty.  Petitioner claims that he pled guilty due to duress and 
compulsion, but the record shows that he pled guilty freely and 
voluntarily, affirming to the court that he had not been threatened.   
 
(R., p.40 (emphasis added).)  Because the Clerk’s Record and transcripts from 
Walck’s underlying criminal case are missing from the appellate record in this 
appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the district court.  See 
Repici, 122 Idaho at 541, 835 P.2d at 1352.   
 Because Walck has failed to provide this Court with an adequate record 
for appellate review of the summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims, as 
challenged in Issues 1, 2, and 3, this Court should affirm the summary dismissal 
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of those claims.  See Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 P.2d at 1288; Murphy, 129 
Idaho at 863, 934 P.2d at 36. 
 
E. Walck Has Failed To Preserve His Claim That His Trial Counsel Was 
Ineffective For Failing To File A Motion To Change Venue 
 
 Embedded in Walck’s first issue on appeal – ineffective assistance of 
counsel – is the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 
motion for a change of venue.  He states: 
Public Defender Christopher Schwartz refused to comply to 
reasonable requests “numerous” [sic] to advocate in clients [sic] 
Petitioner’s best interest with diligence and prudence forth coming 
as an [sic] sworn oblication [sic].  Mr. Schwartz refused to motion 
court for a venue change . . . . 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6)  
Because Walck is claiming, for the first time in this appeal, that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a change of venue, he has 
waived that issue on appeal.  
“Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments 
that were presented below.”  Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 
375, 379 (2007); see also State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367, 347 P.3d 
1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015).  “Issues not raised below generally may not be 
considered for the first time on appeal.”  Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 367, 347 P.3d 
at 1028 (citing State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992)).  
In post-conviction cases, the petitioner must set forth all of his or her claims in 
the post-conviction petition.  See I.C. § 19-4903 (petition must “specifically set 
forth the grounds upon which the application is based”).  Claims not asserted in 
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the pleadings may not be considered on appeal as grounds for finding error in 
the summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief.  Small v. State, 132 
Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998). 
In his post-conviction petition and supporting affidavit, Walck made no 
mention that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a 
change of venue.  (See R., pp.4-12.)  Having failed to raise such an 
ineffectiveness claim before the district court, Walck has failed to preserve the 
issue for review. 
Moreover, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the appellant must 
receive an adverse ruling from the trial court on which to base an assignment of 
error.  See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442, 180 P.3d 476, 481 (2008) 
(“This Court will not review a trial court’s alleged error on appeal unless the 
record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of 
error.”) (internal quotations omitted).  Even had Walck presented the 
ineffectiveness/venue claim, he certainly did not receive a ruling on that issue.   
Because Walck failed to preserve the claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion for a change of venue, he has waived that 
issue on appeal and this Court should refuse to consider it.   
 
F. Even If Walck’s Post-Conviction Claims Are Considered, He Has Failed 
To Show Any Error In The District Court’s Summary Dismissal Order And 
Order Denying His Motion For Default 
 
 The district court summarily dismissed Walck’s post-conviction petition 
with prejudice “for the reasons stated in the court’s notice of intent to dismiss[.]”  
(R., pp.78-79.)  The court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss also denied Walck’s 
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motion for default, which motion was based on Walck’s contention that the state 
failed to file a timely Answer to his post-conviction petition.  (R., p.37.) 
 In the event this Court considers the merits of the district court’s summary 
dismissal of Walck’s post-conviction claims, and also in regard to the court’s 
denial of his motion for default, the state relies upon and incorporates, as if fully 
set forth herein, the legal analysis and conclusions in the district court’s Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss (R., pp.34-43), attached as Appendix A to this brief.  In its 
Notice, the district court correctly held that (1) Walck failed to prove the state 
failed to plead or defend against the petition because it did, in fact, file a timely 
Answer, and (2) Walck failed to present a genuine issue of material fact that 
would warrant an evidentiary hearing on any of his post-conviction claims. 
 Apart from the district court’s well-reasoned analysis, I.C. § 19-4901(b) 
serves as an additional ground for summarily dismissing Walck’s claim that his 
sentences and convictions are illegal under double jeopardy principles because 
he was convicted and sentenced for the same crime in North Dakota.   
 The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
(“UPCPA”) “is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction.”  
I.C. § 19-4901(b).  In addition, an “issue which could have been raised on direct 
appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings” except under very limited circumstances.  Id.  The plain language of 
these statutory provisions indicates that matters that could and should have been 
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addressed in the criminal case or on direct appeal are not properly brought under 
the UPCPA.    
 Where, as here, Walck contends he has been subjected to an “[i]llegal 
conviction and sentence for crime already convicted of and serving time for 
concurrently with the State of North Dakota” (Appellant’s Brief, p.5), he “could 
have” raised the issue on direct appeal.  I.C. § 19-4901(b).  Therefore, Walck has 
forfeited the “double jeopardy” issue and it “may not be considered in post-
conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a 
substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted 
basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt 
and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.”  
I.C. § 19-4901(b).  Walck has failed to make a “substantial factual showing” 
about the unreliability of his guilt and his due diligence in presenting his claim 
earlier.   
 Because the district court reached the correct conclusion but could also 
have dismissed this claim on the additional ground that it is procedurally barred 
under I.C. § 19-4901(b), the state requests this Court to affirm on that additional 
and/or alternative correct basis.  See State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 
P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court’s ruling 
must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory); State v. Murphy, 
129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997) (where district court’s ruling 
is correct it may be upheld on alternative basis). 
 
 15 
G. The District Court’s Order Denying Walck’s Motion To Withdraw His Guilty 
Pleas Must Be Affirmed Because The Court Lacked Jurisdiction To 
Consider It 
  
 On April 12, 2016, almost two months after the district court entered its 
judgment dismissing his post-conviction petition, Walck filed a “Motion to With-
Draw Guilty Plea Declaring Manifest Injustices” (R., pp.108-110) pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c).  The motion, filed in the post-conviction case, stated: 
COMES NOW, Mitchell Walck, Plaintiff/Defendant . . . in the above 
entitled matter as Petitioner has plausible reason [sic] for complete 
withdraw [sic].  Manifest Injustice I.C.R. 33C [sic].  An established 
abridgement of a constitutional right is deeded a manifest injustice 
as a matter of law. 
 
(R., pp.108-110 (emphasis added).)  The district court denied the motion, 
succinctly stating: 
 Concerning the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Declaring 
Manifest Injustices, petitioner [sic] has not cited any authority for 
such a motion in this case, and the court knows of none.  
Accordingly, this motion should be denied. 
 
(R., p.114.) 
 Walck argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which was filed as a part of his post-
conviction case under I.C.R. 33(c)’s “manifest injustice” provision.6  The record 
demonstrates, however, that the district court was without jurisdiction, after 
Walck’s convictions became final, to have even considered Walck’s motion.  The 
                                            
6  Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) states: 
 
Withdrawal of plea of guilty.  A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court 
after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit 
the defendant to withdraw defendant’s plea.  
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district court’s order denying Walck’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea must 
therefore be affirmed.  (See R., pp.111-115.) 
 In State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 73 P.3d 711 (2003), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held: 
Rule 33(c) of the Idaho Criminal Rules does not include any 
provision extending the jurisdiction of the trial court for the purpose 
of hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.  Jakoski was 
sentenced on December 12, 1994, and the judgment was entered 
on December 22, 1994.  He did not appeal the judgment, and it 
therefore became final 42 days later.  Thereafter, the district court 
no longer had jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw Jakoski’s 
guilty plea [filed almost six years after the judgment was entered]. 
 
Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714.   
 The Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in Jakoski precludes any 
consideration of Walck’s motion by the district court: “Article V, § 20, grants 
district courts the power to hear all types of cases, both at law and in equity.  It 
does not grant them perpetual jurisdiction to amend or set aside final judgments 
in cases that they have heard.”  Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714.  Here, 
as in Jakoski, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Walck’s Rule 
33(c) motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the motion was filed on April 
12, 2016, well after the judgment of conviction entered upon his pleas became 
final with the Idaho Supreme Court’s issuance of a remittitur on January 20, 
2015.  (See R., pp.35,108.)  Because Walck filed his Rule 33(c) motion over one 
year after his conviction became final, the district court no longer had jurisdiction 
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to consider it.7  Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Walck’s motion to 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
summary dismissal of Walck’s post-conviction petition.  
 DATED this 24th day of October, 2016. 
 
 
       
 _/s/ John C. McKinney     _ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of October, 2016, served 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
 
 MITCHELL LEE WALCK 
 INMATE #110973 
 I.S.C.C. UNIT K-X POD 
 P. O. BOX 70010 




 __/s/ John C. McKinney_____ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
JCM/dd 
                                            
7  The state notes that district courts have jurisdiction to consider claims 
regarding the validity of guilty pleas raised for the first time in a post-conviction 
petition.  I.C. § 19-4901; Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 348-349, 247 P.3d 
210, 213-214 (Ct. App. 2010).  A motion filed after a judgment dismissing a post-
conviction petition is not an appropriate vehicle for challenging a guilty plea in a 
post-conviction action.   
